BOOK REVIEW, Sathish A.

BOOK REVIEW, SATHISH A.

 

INTRODUTION

As I begin my book review on one of the moral philosophy books, I would like to start with the book titled, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy by Bernard Williams. In this book the author states that how things are in moral philosophy, not about how they might be, but I would say that nobody knows or can know the things as they should be. And this book also carries the criticism of present moral philosophy because some of the points and views are pertaining to the question how far the moral philosophy could help us to recreate ethical life.

            In other words, this is the big question which is frequantly asked or being raised by the people whether they are rich or poor.Now, may be, I first try to state the main points and views of the author and then the evaluation of the disscusion and then I also  want to add up or put forth the critical points on what the author deals with and  my understanding on ethics and the limits of philosophy.

 

THE VIEW OF THE AUTHOR

            Naturally, the author starts his disscusion in the initial chapters with some relevant points and opinions quoting from Socrates, what we are talking about is how one should live, and Plato also proposed or thought that philosophy could answer the question. But, in fact, we know that like Socrates, he hoped that one could direct one's life, if necessary redirect it, through an understanding that was distinctively philosophical, that is to say, general and absract, rationally reflective, and concerned with what can be known through different kinds of inquiry. The author also makes a point, the aims of moral philosophy, any hopes it may have of being worth serious attention, are bound up with the fate of Socrates' question, even if it is not true that philosophy, itself, can reasonably hope to answer it.

The author, Bernard Williams, contiunes saying, I have touched on considerations of egoism and on considerations that go outside the self –of benevolence, for instance, or fairness. But there is a questioin that has proved very impotant to ethics of how far outside the self such considerations should I have mentioned several sorts of ethical consideration, and mire one kind of nonethical. Philosophy has traditionally shown a desire to reduce this diversity, on both sides of the divide. It has tended, first of all, to see all nonethical considerations as reducible to egoism, the narrowest form of self-interest. Indeed some philosophers have wanted to reduce that to one special kind of egoistic concern, the pursuit of pleasure. Kant, in particular, believed that every action not done from moral principle was done for rhe agent's pleasure. This needs to be distinguished from an other idea, that all actions, including thise done for ethical reasons, are equally motivated by the pursuit of pleasure.

            Unless the ethical life, or (more narrowly) morality, can be justified by philosophy, we shall be open to relativism, amoralism, and disorder. As they often put it: when an amoralist calls ethical consideration in doubt, and suggest that there is no reason to follow the requirements of morality. Human beings pursue power and pleasure. They may, rationally, have to curtail thar pursuit becaues of other people's power. They may also, irrationally, come to think that  it is right or noble to respect others' interests; but in that case they are being misled by conventions, social rules that inculcate these respectable but baseless assumptions.

But for plato and for Socrates, what was first ethically desirable would have to be something that lay in the agent, If  anything outside the soul, as they put it, is ethicalluy primary-some rule, for instance, or institution- then we are left with the possibility that there could be a person whose deepest needs and the state of whose soul were such thet it was not rational for him to act in accordance with that rule or institution and, so long as that was possible, the task of answering Socrates' question in a way favorable to the ethical life would not be carried out.

This may seem a surprising thing to say. Kant's name is associated with an approach to  morality in which, it is often supposed, there can be no foundations for morality at all. What is an ethical theory? The most helpful use of  that expression can best be caught by a rather complex definition. An ethical theory is a theoretical account of  what ethical thought and practice are, which account either implies a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles or else implies that there cannot be such a test. It is the first kind of ethical theory, the positive kind, that concerns me here.

 

MY VIEW AND CRITICAL EVALUATION

            The first chapters look back at the Greek ideas of virtue. Middle chapters look at modern morality as an institution; the author highlights the many faults in this public morality. Final chapters look at alternatives. The discussion covers a lot of ground, including consequentialism, utilitarianism and egalitarianism. Reading the book for me, is at times a challenge, but sometimes in my opinion, I felt that the author doesn't make himself clear. And further, if we see, Kant is mentioned early, but only half-hazardly does his place in the theme emerge. Williams, once he explains the weaknesses with system-building moralities like Kant's, seems at a loss for alternatives. Whether values can count as knowledge is a question that complicates the challenge.

The final chapters are best. Williams clearly wants to turn back to Greek virtues for a renewed foundation of modern ethics. He suggests trying to stress the importance of free inquiry and a reflective consciousness as an alternative to moral system-building. His references here to the psychology, history and sociology of mankind suggest a non-cognitive meta-ethics that would delimit the scope of ethical inquiry. 
            The discussion leaves off at this point; what rules should govern public acts remain undecided. So I'm not convinced Williams has won his point that mankind must eschew moral systems for something more personal. What keeps this an interesting discussion is the distinction it makes between morality and ethics, and the non-cognitive alternatives it offers us. I recommend the book for readers who have at least some familiarity with ethical terminology.

I really appreciated his vision on - as the title shows - the limits of philosophy, i.e. what philosophy can say about the ethical. Though it might look as this work can be used as an introduction to ethics, I personally do not advice it, due the somehow difficult style of writing. A better alternative for an introduction is his other work Although he treats certain historical positions quite shallowly, this book is a joy to read (and reread). I think any secular person who wants to take "morality" seriously (Kantians, utilitarians, I'm looking at you!) will need to deal with the objections raised by this book.