BOOK REVIEW, Sundararaju Madri.

Introduction   When I am deeply understanding  this whole book, I approached that which converse about the moral philosophy, where we may  realize that the word 'intuitionism' it means that  it is a kind of feeling of something or expectation of something in the universe. As we are appropriate this intuition more clearly and more observably, we may indentify it. That there is a moral in the intuition, what we look and observe around so we may find that there should be good and bad, right and wrong. So the author expresses that moral philosophy offers a critical survey of major trends in moral philosophy in the twentieth century. Intuitionism which is briefly considered and the more recent theory of moral discourse are examined at greater length. I consider what the author says when we speak of this intuition; there should be right, duty and obligation. Which he doesn't sharply distinguishes between the rights, the wrong. But it depends on the right view of every human being in the society.       1. INTUITIONISM               Intuitionism is a kind of feeling of the things in the right ways, which should be appropriated. It is before the knowledge through which we perceive it with our own experience. Consideration of intuitionism in the moral philosophy of this century starts naturally from the work of G.E. Moore. He is a good philosopher of most distinguished ability and very great importance in the history of the subject, was by means at his in the field of ethics; his principles of ethics is a good deal more interesting than most intuitionist contributions, and was in face the most widely influential of any.   I expect that he is a good intuitionist but latter, he realizes that he is not an "intuitionist" in the ordinary sense of the term. The ordinary intuitionist holds, according to him, that moral truths of many different kinds, perhaps of all kinds, may be known to be true 'by intuition' that is they are if properly considered simply self-evident, or just seen to be true.  Moore disagrees with this. In his view, only a small and very special class of moral judgments consists of truths which are thus self-evident; the truth of many more must be investigated by other means, and indeed can seldom, if ever be established with certainty. It transpires however that in Moore's opinion all moral judgments which do not belong to, must in the end inevitably be founded upon, that special class of moral judgments which are self-evident; and it is one may think philosophically much more significant that he should hold the fundamental truths of morals to be self- evident, than that he should hold that many propositions of morals are not.   The basic moral principles are self-evident truths -- known truths that require no further proof or justification. To apply these to concrete actions requires further information; it's never self-evident what we ought to do in a concrete situation. To arrive at the self-evident principles of morality requires reflection and intellectual maturity. The test of such principles isn't their initial plausibility, but whether a careful examination uncovers implications that clash with our intuitions.   2. Objections to intuitionism   Intuitionism, despite its initial plausibility, has some problems. In math, principles claimed to be self-evident are precise and largely agreed on by the experts. In ethics, principles claimed to be self-evident are vague and widely disputed. Intuitionists themselves disagree widely about what is self-evident. Moral intuitions come largely from social conditioning, and vary greatly between cultures. So it's hard to believe that such intuitions are a reliable guide to objective moral truths. And appealing to intuitions can lead to an early stalemate on moral issues -- as when we argue with someone who has racist intuitions.     When it is true that Moore does not much like and seldom employs, the term 'intuition', he sees that those who have spoken of certain truths as being known by 'intuition' have often meant by this simply that those truths are self-evident, or are known directly, without proof or argument: and in this sense he himself undoubtedly maintains that the fundamental truths of morals are known by intuition or alternatively as he sometimes puts it they are known are intuitions. He offers certainly no alternative expression of his own: and since he agrees so closely in substance with other intuitionists, it is proper enough that his position should accept the name.   Fortunately it is possible to summaries quite briefly what he takes to be the main, most persistent, and most damaging, confusion into which so many of his predecessors have fallen; and it is in his criticism of this that his own view can most readily be made clear. He says it is concerned with, and may even be defined by its characteristic concern with, the predicate 'good' and its converse 'bad'; and though this concern may take more than one form, the central questions s what the predicate 'good ' meant stand for. He insists that it is not a verbal one; it would be beside the point even if it were possible, to excogitate some synonymous expression conforming with the use made of the word 'good' by those whose speak English. The real question is what is the property for which 'good' stands? What is the property which any subject has in virtue of which it would be true to say that subject is good?     Conclusion   As I conclude this review of the book, we must mention that deficiency in intuitionism of which later writers, as we shall find, have been most acutely conscious. Moral predicates, it was assumed, stand for moral properties. If so, to attribute a moral predicate to some subject is simply to assert that the item referred to has some moral property it is to state that fact, to convey that piece of information. Now pieces of moral information are related to any other features of the world, and rather more than unclear throw their truth can be established or confirmed.   We must now take note that it's also left very far from clear what such pieces of information, even if recognized to be true, have to do with our conduct. Let us grant that there are, here and there in the world, some items which have the moral properties intuitions talk about and some which have not: why should we care? Why does the presence or absence of these properties matter? In becoming aware that some proposed course of action is obligatory.  We have to know a truth about the world. But what has this truth that we recognize to do with our behavior? Why should we adopt that course of action rather than some other? The fact that the course of action is obligatory is presumably meant to be a reason for adopting it; moral judgments it seems like other judgments convey information what it important for relevant to our decisions our choices, our advice, our recommendations.