An Introduction to Ethics, Ranjit Dung Dung

 Book review

An introduction to ethics. By J. D. Mabbott. London: Hutchinson and Co., 1966. Pp. 158.

The aim of the book is to give information of some general understanding of ethics. The book has twelve chapters and has 158 pages. The book is very handy in size and the language of it is very simple to understand. In each chapter the author tries to bring out the in-depth meaning of ethical concepts. The book is useful in a double sense, it not only written for readers who have not previously encountered moral philosophy but for those who have read no philosophy at all. The major concern of the author is to clarify the certain words: 'good', 'bad', 'ought', right', 'duty', 'praise', and 'blame', etc. thus the mostly deals with the characteristics of human conduct.

On the outset, the author starts with explaining the pleasure utilitarianism. The key words in morals are 'good', 'right', and 'ought'. On good Utilitarian distinguishes between what is good as a means to an end and what is good as an end. Petrol, a knife, etc, are good if they are effective for their purposes. For the utilitarian only one thing is good in itself, good for its own sake that is 'pleasure' and only one thing is bad in itself that is 'pain'. Everything else called 'good' is good because it increases pleasure or diminishes pain. There are many criticisms against the ideal utilitarianism which is based on the acceptance of certain moral rules and how their theory avoids the difficulties of a Kantian commitment to absolute rules.

There are some rules which are called moral rules without which no civilized society could survive and by following which few values can be achieved. Moral values vary in the degree to which they are constitutive or merely regulative. The rules against killing and promise-breaking are of this kind. The moral rules are mean to regulate the action of the people in the way of so far as their action is said to be the moral actions.

Moore and Ross have differed greatly about what makes an act right. But they were completely agreed on one central issue. They both thought that in a given circumstances, there is one act for a man to do and this act is his duty and is what he ought to do. What make it right are the existing circumstances, and the man's own beliefs and motives have nothing to do with it. One's duty does not depend on any belief of his/her nor should it depend upon motives. Duty emerges from the right conscience to do something correctly.  The author is more concern about use of moral words and if so then the solution in the foundations of ethics would seem the proper one. Therefore the author suggests to have the subjective use of 'ought' and 'duty' because the subjective view is a comparatively recently and highly civilized achievement. And second reason why the objective view is current is that there is sense of the word 'duty' or 'duties' which is certainly objective. The duties of an orderly officer or of a clerk of court are objective because they are laid down in official documents. But the subjective use depends on one's beliefs about fact. The discussion urges that the subjective criteria for 'duty' and 'ought' that only with this criteria can praise be associated with 'ought' and blame with 'ought not'. There is also a dimension of right to think intelligently along with the duty to act. This 'duty to think' is the object duty.

There are differences of views regarding the moral beliefs. When beliefs differ we normally appeal to argument and evidence to us to decide which view is correct. And indeed the man's duty depends on his moral beliefs as well as on his factual beliefs implicitly recognized both the differences in moral beliefs and the consequence that when beliefs differ one must be mistaken. Some moral principles do cohere in such a way that altering one involves altering others.

The emotive theory examines about the various subjective views of moral values. Subjectivism in the past has rested on the evidence of variation in moral judgment and the lack of any verification-procedure when moral view differs. This has naturally led to the conclusion that, when views differ, it makes no sense to ask which judgment is nearer the truth, and consequently to the conclusion that moral judgment do not express cognitive states such as knowledge, belief, opinion; for if they did it would make sense to ask about their truth and falsity.  The evidence of variation and non-verifiability has been supplemented in recent philosophy by other considerations making for subjectivism. It has been noted that an objectivist theory has to rest on a number of propositions of a type which modern logic rejects entirely. These propositions assert necessary connections between different characteristics of 'synthetic a priori proposition'. 'Synthetic' because the states of affairs are different from each other, for obviously one could assert a necessary connection between being a horse and being an animal if animality were part of the analysis of the term 'horse'.  Some examples of the way in which objectivist theories involve a priori synthetic judgment may now be given. Ross argues against the view that moral judgment merely expresses attitudes of approval. He says that we cannot decide whether or not to approve of something until we have a reason to do so, and the reason why we approve of an action is that we recognize in it the attribute of rightness. Now what kind of connection is this, between approving and recognizing as right? It is surely a necessary connection, and a priori.  Subjectivist theory has been accepted as analysis of ordinary language. One reason is that language can be used for a great variety of purposes.

The problem of punishment is closely connected with those of the free will. The main division between theories of punishment of that which separates the retributive theory from the rest. The retributive theory maintains that punishment is justified because of the wrong done by the person to be punished. The various utilitarian theories of punishment can be into a. preventive, b. deterrent, c. reformatory.

In the last part of the book the author tries to examine the word 'right', which is both positive and negative. Right is described as the act appropriate to the circumstances in which a moral agent finds himself. If an act which is said to be moral and agent performs it then there is no question objection because the act is moral and he has the duty to do it. Those actions can be granted as moral if they are execution of moral judgments or decisions and that the making of moral judgments is itself a type of moral action.

Evaluation

There are two lines of which might very properly be urged against the preceding chapters. First that the example are vey uninteresting and the second is that very different types of problems are not adequately distinguished. The choice of examples has been an intentional policy. It would have been much more interesting to look for examples of heroic virtue, or of really difficult complexity, as the existentialities do. Keeping promises, paying debts, telling the truth- these are the small change of moral lives. The two difficulties about the more fascinating examples are these. First they require a great deal more space to them out, and secondly they are liable to deflect attention from the point they are illustrated especially if they are themselves debated issues. Here it is clear that the middle of the road is not an exciting area and one meets few fascinating creatures there in comparison with gutter and the ditch, but one gets long faster and with fewer distractions. The confusion of types of problem is a more serious matter. There are first the most general and abstract questions; the distinction between means and ends, between factual and moral beliefs, between description and expression. Then there are questions like the issue between the utilitarian's and their opponents, between free will and determinism, between subjectivism and objectivism. The first range of questions could have been fully discussed without raising or deciding any of the second range. Then thirdly there are the questions about what has moral value or other value.

The book is a valuable text in a double sense, it not only written for readers who have not previously encountered moral philosophy but for those who have read no philosophy at all. The major concern of the author is to clarify the certain concepts: 'good', 'bad', 'ought', right', 'duty', 'praise', and 'blame', etc. thus the mostly deals with the characteristics of human conduct. Thus the book is very helpful to supply enough information concerning ethical discussions.