Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism, New York: Prometheus Books, 1987, 9+83 pages, ISBN: 0-87975-376-5
Utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill was originally published in three installments in Fraser's Magazines (1861). This essay is today the most widely read exposition of its subject. Utilitarianism is not his invention, for the elements of utilitarian thought are found in the writings of the earlier philosophers like David Hume and Jeremy Bentham. Under the influence of Bentham, Mill's father, James Mill, incorporated the principles of utilitarianism into his education of unparallel scope and depth which influenced his philosophy. The young Mill began his study of Greek at the age of three, began learning Latin at eight, and read exhaustively in many areas including philosophy, logic, mathematics, history, and the classic.
The popularity of Utilitarianism rests in its brevity and breadth. In the space of just five short chapters, Mill not only explains in some detail what the principle of utility says but also exhibits its connections with other theories; attempts to display its grounding in the facts of human nature; sympathetically states and responds to a number of common objections to it; and shows how it can capture much of the complexity, subtlety, and variety of our ordinary moral and valuation framework.
The opening chapter consists of general remarks. He rightly said that all action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient. Mill said that at the root of all morality, or if there be several, there should be a determinate order of precedence among them; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict, ought to be self-evident. Mill exalted the greatest happiness principle when he said that in the absence of the first principle in ethics, the greatest happiness principle has a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority. He even said that the utilitarian arguments are indispensible even for those of the a priori moralists.
Mill attempted to contribute something toward the understanding and appreciation of the "utilitarian" or "happiness" theory. For Mill the question about the ultimate ends are not amenable to proof. Whatever can be proved to be good must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof.
Chapter two deals with what 'Utilitarianism' is. He clarifies the accusation and misconception of the term "utility" with pleasure. This section contains the creed of the 'greatest happiness principle' or 'utility,' that is, "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." Happiness is the intended pleasure and the absence of pain; and unhappiness is pain and the privation of pleasure. This theory of morality is grounded namely that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. However he does not accept the Epicurean equation of human beings' pleasure with those of beasts, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conception of happiness.
He differentiates quality and quantity pleasures and of the two choices of pleasure the one which majority accepts should be accepted as final. According to the greatest happiness principle the ultimate end is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality. This is the moral standard of morality for greatest happiness principle and is defined as "the rules and precepts for human conduct." Utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness, but the also the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness.
What is the ultimate sanction of the principle of utility? This aspect is dealt in Chapter III. The question is to be asked here is, why am I bound to promote the general happiness? The answer lies in the deeply rooted feeling of unity with our fellow creature. The conscientious feelings of mankind are the sanctions of a particular moral standard. Mill's belief is that moral feelings are not innate but acquired. The moral feelings are not indeed a part of our nature in the sense of being in any perceptible degree present in all of us. There is a social feeling in every human being and they are born into the society. As a social and society being, it must have a standard which is acceptable to all and to which everybody must obey. Improving the state of the human mind leads to the increase of feeling of unity with all the rest.
The main theme of Chapter four is on 'desire,' 'virtue' and 'will.' The utilitarian doctrine holds that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable as an end, all other things beings only desirable as means to that end. The principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, say music, or any given exemption from pain, as health, is to be looked upon as means to happiness, and to be desired on that account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end. Virtue, according to utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end but is capable of becoming so.
Desiring something for its own sake is, desiring as part of happiness. The person is made happy by its mere possession, and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it. Those who desire virtue for its own sake desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united.
Will is different from desire. Will is the active phenomenon while desire is the state of passive sensibility. Will is the child of desire, and passes out of the dominion of its parent only to come under that of habit. Both in feeling and in conduct, habit is the only things which impart certainty.
Mill's account of right and wrong, individual rights, and justice are found in this final chapter. Mill argues that, right and wrong are not simply equivalent to what does and does not maximize happiness. Just as acts that are wrong are only a subset of those that fail to maximize unhappiness, so too are acts that are unjust are only a subset of those that are wrong.
The sentiment of justice, according to Mill, is the natural feeling or retaliation or vengeance, rendered by intellect and sympathy applicable to those injuries which wound us through and society at large. When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law or by that of education and opinion. Punishment for the injustice is either for their own good or for that of society. For Mill the justice which is grounded on utility is the chief part and incomparably the most sacred and binding part of all morality. A person is responsible for what he has done voluntarily or could voluntarily have avoided. The first judicial virtue is impartiality. Everybody has the right to be treated equally unless some recognized social expediency requires the reverse.
In conclusion we can say that Mill's Utilitarianism is altruistic and quantitative. This is clear when he said that it is nobler to be capable of resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness, or chance of it for the sake of others. This he considers the greatest or the highest virtue. The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. But it refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. This theory has practical difficulties and also serious doubts about the moral rightness of following the greatest happiness principle in some instances, for example, clearly it seems wrong to perform such acts as lying, theft, and murder, and yet there is no guarantee that such acts will always bring less happiness than the alternatives. Thus, utilitarianism is often held to be unable to do complete justice to our moral aversion to such acts. To avoid the extremes, the utilitarian must somehow distinguish between what we are obligated to do and what it would be merely nice for us to do.
John Paul Vemo S.
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