CONDUCT, Sebin Kumbalath

CONDUCT

              No subject  is more central to moral philosophy or ethics than that of right and wrong action. Although the correlative term 'right' and 'wrong' have important non-moral uses-as, for example, when we speak of the right or wrong way to fix a car ethicists are primarly interested in moral right and wrong, and tyhey typically regard a theory of wright and wron in this sense as the most important element in any overall conception or view of ethics.

              To be sure there are related notions like 'ought' and moral 'obligation' that play a role in any complete or overall moral theory. But it is usually assumed that such notions can be defined in terms of rightness and/or wrongness. Roughly speaking, an act is obligatory or ought, to be done if it would be wrong not to perform it, and so a theory of right and wrong is tantamount to a theory of obligation and of what morally ought to be done.

               Of course, one in any event needs to distinguish theories or conceptions of right and wrong from analyses or definitions of the terms 'right' and 'wrong'.  To a large extent, philosophers' views about conduct have depended on what they wanted to say about moral rules and principles. It is natural to think of morality as some kind of code containing action-guiding rules or principle. Then different theories of conduct would be based in differences ab out what were the ultimately valid principles or rules of morality. Act-utilitarianism in one standard frof holds, for example, that there is one basic principle of morality, the principle of utility, which treats actions as right or wrong depending on whether they maximise the utility or welfare of the people they affect. By contrast Rossian intutionism accepts a smll set of basic moral principles no one of which always takes precedence over any other and regards the rightness and wrongess of particular acts as often amatter of delicate balancing among the different ultimate principles that apply in a given situation. Kantians regard the rightness of an action as a matter of whether the maxim or underlying purpose of the action is one which coul be constantly  willed to govern every one's behaviour-though some Kantians may prefer to say, instead, that acts are right if they don't involve treating anyone merely as a means, which idea has seemed promising to many, but is quite obviously is need of expansion. All the above-named theories have sizable or at the very least vocal followings among contemporary philosophers.