MORAL REALISM, Shibin Antony

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Moral Realism

Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which are bad. Behind this bad statement lies a wealth of complexity. If one is a full- blown moral realist, one probably accepts the following claim. First, moral fast are somehow special and different from other sorts of fact. Realists differ, however, about whether the sort of specialness required is compatible with taking   some natural fact that if we do this action, we will have given someone the help they need. Second, realists hold that moral facts are in dependent of any believes of thoughts we might have about them. What is right is not determined by what or anybody else thinks is right. It is not even determined by what. We all think is right, even if we could be get    t o agree. Third it is possible for us to make mistakes about what is right and what is wrong. No matter how carefully and honestly we think about what to do, there is still guarantee that we will come up with right answer. So that people conscientiously decide they should do may not be the same as what they should do.

       Again it is a view that moral beliefs and judgments can be true or false, that there exist moral properties to which moral agents are attentive or inattentive. Sensitive or in sensitive, that moral values are discovered, not willed into existence nor constituted by emotional reactions. Far from being a function of wishes, wants and desires moral demands furnish reasons for acting, reason that take precedence over any other reasons. Moral realists are arguably justified in displaying the inadequacies of subjectivist moral theories, but less successful so far in developing a convincing positive account of the reality of values.

Moral realism allows the ordinary rules of logic to be applied straightforwardly to moral statements. We can say that a moral belief is false or unjustified or contradictory in the same way we would about a factual belief. Another advantage of moral realism is its capacity to resolve moral disagreements: If two moral beliefs contradict one another, realism says that they cannot both be right, and therefore everyone involved ought to be seeking out the right answer to resolve the disagreement. Contrary theories of meta-ethics have trouble even formulating the statement "this moral belief is wrong," and so they cannot resolve disagreements in this way.

According to Richard Boyd, moral realism means that: Moral statements are the sorts of statements which are true or false, the truth or falsity (approximate truth...) of moral statements is largely independent of our moral opinions, theories, etc.; Ordinary canons of moral reasoning—together with ordinary canons of scientific and everyday factual reasoning—constitute, under many circumstances at least, a reliable method for obtaining and improving moral knowledge.