RESPECT, Ranjit Dung dung

RESPECT The ideas that people should be treated with respect and that individuals should respect themselves are important elements of everyday morality and moral philosophy. Some theories treat respect for persons as the basis of morality or the hallmark of a just society, while self-respect is often viewed as a core moral duty or something that social institution must support. Most generally respect is acknowledgment of an object as having important, worth, status, or power. As its Latin root respicere (look back) indicates, to respect something is to pay attention or give consideration to it. As the etymology also suggests, respect is responsive: the object is regarded as due, deserving of rightly claiming acknowledgement. Respect can be an in mediated emotional response, but it typically involves a conception of certain forms of acknowledgement as appropriate in virtue of some feature of or fact about the object which is the basis of respect. Respect thus differs from attitudes such as liking, which are based in the agent's interest. Respect also typically involves behaving in ways that show regard for the object or refraining from certain conduct out of respect for it. We can respect rules by obeying them, dangerous things by taking precautions, and authorities by referring to them. Moral philosophy insists upon the concept of self-respect. It is important in its own right, involves due appreciation of one's morally significant worth: worth one has either as a person or in some potion or activity or worth earned through the quality of one's character and conduct. In many moral theories persons are regarded as having a distinct status such that they are owed distinct kind of regard. This is not respect for their talents, achievements, or the means at their disposal, such as wealth or influence. Rather, it is respect owed to each person as a self-determining rational agent and an equal participant in a common moral order. This moral respect is central in Kant's theorizing and in many accounts of person's rights. A violation of a right is sometimes interpreted as a failure of respect or as using a person as a means. Typically rationality is the basic this respects, in contrast to say, morally owing things to persons on account of the fact that they can experience pleasure and pain. There might b things that are desirable for their own sake and thus significant to a theory of value, while being independent of the type of respect indicated here. Critics of consequentiality moral theories sometimes object to them on the grounds that they fail to respect adequately persons as distinct individuals. Consequentiality may insist that each person is to count equally, but the moral worth of actions and practices is still to be ascertained on the basis of consequences rather than fixed or unrevisable limits on how persons are to be treated.